Modern Structures

NAV lending, subscription lines, CLOs, and the evolving leveraged finance landscape

~15 min read

The debt instruments covered in earlier lessons (senior secured loans, mezzanine, unitranche) are the building blocks of deal-level financing. But the PE industry's relationship with debt extends well beyond individual transactions. Over the past decade, several structural innovations have reshaped how PE funds borrow, how leveraged loans get recycled through the financial system, and how interest rate dynamics affect portfolio companies. Understanding these modern structures is essential because they influence fund-level returns, portfolio construction, and the systemic risks that connect PE to the broader credit markets.

KEY CONCEPT

NAV Lending: Borrowing Against the Portfolio

Net Asset Value (NAV) lending allows a PE fund to borrow against the aggregate value of its portfolio rather than at the individual company level. The lender's collateral is the fund's equity interests in its portfolio companies, valued at their current net asset value. If a fund holds 10 companies collectively worth $2B in equity value, a NAV lender might extend a $400-$600M facility (20-30% loan-to-value).

NAV lending has grown rapidly, with the market estimated at over $100B in outstanding facilities by 2024 (per Preqin and 17Capital estimates). Funds use NAV facilities for multiple purposes: funding add-on acquisitions without calling additional LP capital, paying distributions to LPs in continuation vehicles, bridging the gap between a portfolio company exit and the next investment, or providing liquidity when exit markets are slow. Critics argue that NAV lending introduces fund-level leverage that is not always transparent to LPs and can obscure true underlying performance by using borrowed money to fund distributions. The best practice is full LP disclosure, including how NAV borrowings affect reported IRR and cash-on-cash returns.

KEY CONCEPT

Subscription Lines of Credit (Capital Call Facilities)

A subscription line (also called a capital call facility) is a revolving credit facility secured by the uncalled capital commitments of a fund's limited partners. When a PE fund closes on $1B in commitments from LPs, it does not call all $1B on day one. A subscription line lets the fund borrow against those unfunded commitments to deploy capital quickly, then repay the line when it issues the actual capital call to LPs weeks or months later.

Subscription lines create operational efficiency: the fund can close a deal immediately without waiting 10-15 business days for LP capital call wires to arrive. However, they have a controversial side effect on performance measurement. Because the fund uses borrowed money during the early months of an investment (before calling LP capital), the LP's cash is outstanding for a shorter period. This mechanically increases the fund's IRR (which is time-weighted) without improving the total dollar return (the multiple). Studies suggest that subscription line usage can inflate reported IRR by 200-400+ basis points. Most institutional LPs now request both 'with subscription line' and 'without subscription line' IRR figures to evaluate true investment performance.

CLOs: The Engine Behind the Leveraged Loan Market

A Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) is a structured finance vehicle that purchases a diversified pool of leveraged loans (typically 150-300 individual loans) and finances itself by issuing tranches of debt and equity. The CLO's debt tranches are rated from AAA (the safest, lowest-yielding tranche) down to BB or B (the riskiest, highest-yielding tranche). Equity holders sit at the bottom and receive the residual cash flows after all debt tranches are paid.

CLOs are the single largest buyer of leveraged loans in the US market. They purchase approximately 60-70% of all new institutional leveraged loan issuance. This makes CLOs a critical link in the PE financing chain: when a PE sponsor acquires a company and finances it with a Term Loan B, the arranging bank syndicates that loan, and a large portion of it ends up in CLO portfolios. If CLO formation slows (due to rising defaults, regulatory changes, or reduced investor appetite for CLO tranches), the supply of leveraged loan capital shrinks, spreads widen, and PE deal financing becomes more expensive and harder to obtain.

CLOs also have a reinvestment period (typically 4-5 years after issuance) during which the CLO manager can actively trade in and out of loans. This reinvestment activity provides liquidity to the secondary leveraged loan market and allows CLOs to recycle capital from loans that are repaid (via refinancing or company sales) into new loan originations. After the reinvestment period ends, the CLO enters its amortization phase and returns cash to investors as loans mature or are sold.

How a CLO Recycles Leveraged Loans

1

PE sponsor acquires company

The PE fund finances the acquisition with a Term Loan B, arranged and syndicated by a bank.

2

CLO purchases the loan

The CLO manager buys a portion of the syndicated loan for its portfolio, alongside 150-300 other leveraged loans.

3

CLO issues tranches

The CLO finances its loan purchases by issuing rated debt tranches (AAA through BB) and equity. Each tranche receives cash flows based on its priority.

4

Cash flows through the waterfall

Interest and principal from the loan portfolio flow to CLO tranches in order of seniority: AAA first, then AA, A, BBB, BB, and finally equity.

5

Reinvestment and recycling

When a loan is repaid (e.g., the PE sponsor sells the company and retires the debt), the CLO manager reinvests the proceeds into new leveraged loans during the reinvestment period.

Floating vs. Fixed Rate: When Each Matters

Leveraged loans are almost always floating rate, priced at SOFR plus a fixed spread. High-yield bonds are almost always fixed rate, with a stated coupon that does not change over the life of the bond. This distinction has significant implications for PE portfolio companies and their sponsors.

When interest rates rise, floating-rate borrowers see their interest expense increase immediately. A company with $500M in floating-rate debt at SOFR + 400 bps saw its annual interest cost rise from roughly $22M (when SOFR was near zero in early 2022) to over $47M (when SOFR exceeded 5% in late 2023). That $25M increase in interest expense flows directly through to reduced free cash flow, lower debt paydown capacity, and weaker coverage ratios. For PE-owned companies with tight coverage, rapid rate increases can push them toward financial distress.

Conversely, when rates fall, floating-rate borrowers benefit immediately. Fixed-rate borrowers do not. This asymmetry is why some PE sponsors use interest rate hedges (swaps or caps) to convert a portion of their floating-rate exposure to effectively fixed. A SOFR cap, for example, sets a maximum rate the borrower will pay, providing downside protection if rates spike while preserving the benefit if rates stay low or decline.

The post-2020 rate cycle illustrated these dynamics vividly. PE portfolio companies that were financed at near-zero rates in 2020-2021 faced a sudden doubling or tripling of interest costs as the Federal Reserve raised rates through 2022-2023. Companies that had purchased rate caps were partially protected. Companies that had not were forced to absorb the full impact, with some requiring sponsor equity cures or covenant amendments to manage through the cycle.

QUIZ

Quiz: Modern Structures

6 questions · ~3 min